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INTRODUCTION

Same-sex couples have been raising children for decades.' Now that
marriage is a fundamental right of same-sex couples, it seems likely - if not
certain - that non-biological same-sex parents will enjoy the presumption
of parentage to children born during a marriage or through adoption.2
There are older children, however, who were born or adopted into same-sex
* Associate Professor, Western Michigan University Thomas M. Cooley Law School.
B.A., 1998, Michigan State University, J.D., 2001, Wayne State University Law
School. The author teaches Property Law and Secured Transactions. He also serves as
President of the Board of Directors at Affirmations, Southeast Michigan's community
center for LGBTQ people and their allies.
1. See Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining
Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other
NontraditionalFamilies, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 461 (1990).
2. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
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families when marriage was unavailable or uncertain. The custodial rights
of their non-biological parents are unclear.
While this issue will eventually sunset, courts will face the issue of how
to determine the standing of an unmarried, non-biological same-sex parent
seeking custody for children brought into a relationship before marriage
equality for some time. Non-biological, non-adoptive, and unmarried
same-sex parents have a relationship to these children unique to other third
parties but still find themselves subject to standing rules developed for
other individuals. These rules are all grounded in protecting the biological
parent's rights as fundamental and superior to any other non-biological
parental figure. But this distinction does not merit the same weight when
judged against the rights of a same-sex partner to that biological parent at
the time of the birth, someone who did not have the option to biologically
participate and that we now recognize was denied the fundamental right to
marry or adopt a child.
The custodial or visitation standing of non-biological parental figures has
been acknowledged by states to different degrees and in limited
circumstances for grandparents, step-parents, or under doctrines such as
equitable parenting, 3 in loco parentis,4 or psychological parenthood. 5 The
application of these rules to a non-biological same-sex parent could be
tragic. A child who has a significant relationship with the non-biological
parent could be prevented the benefit of their parenting, and the child may
experience the significant trauma of separation without any adjudication on
the merits of whether visitation or custody for that non-biological parent
could in fact be in the best interest of the child.
This article provides some background on the standing afforded to non3. The American Law Institute has defined "equitable parenthood," also known
as a "de facto parent," as an individual other than a legal parent or parent by estoppel
who, for a significant period of time not less than two years (i) lived with the child, and
(ii) for reasons primarily other than financial compensation, and with the agreement of
a legal parent to form a parent-child relationship, or as a result of a complete failure or
inability of any legal parent to perform caretaking functions, (A) regularly performed a
majority of the caretaking functions for the child, or (B) regularly performed a share of
caretaking functions at least as great as that of the parent with whom the child primarily
lived.
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03(l)(c) (AM. LAW INST. 2003).

4. "In Loco Parentis" involves the unofficial or informal transfer of parental
status and parental duties onto a person or entity who is not the child's legal parent, but
who intends to take on the parental role. See 67A C.J.S. Parentand Child § 367 (2016).
5. Psychological parenthood is a consensual status that can be created in a nonbiological third party. Generally, the third party must be given consent by the legal
parent to (1) perform a significant degree of parental functions, (2) live with the child,
and (3) form a parent-child bond with the child. See V.C. v. M.J.B, 748 A.2d 539 (N.J.
2000).
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biological, unmarried, non-adoptive, same-sex parents to children born
before the Supreme Court found the fundamental right to marry for samesex couples. 6 It then examines the divergence that has developed in
accepting the custodial standing of non-biological same-sex parents since
the fundamental right to marry for same-sex couples was guaranteed. It
also argues that non-biological same-sex partner standing is distinguishable
from that of other third parties and should always be recognized under an
appropriate test.
Going forward, this article uses the term "non-biological same-sex
parent" to mean a same-sex partner that was in a relationship with a child's
biological parent at the time of birth. This term presumes that the same-sex
couple was unmarried at the time of the child's birth and that the nonbiological parent did not adopt the child. This article also acknowledges
that parenting rights can be granted to different degrees and using different
terminologies. Here we will use the term "custodial standing" to represent
the right of a non-biological same-sex parent to seek a parenting right to
any degree later determined appropriate by a court.
II.

NON-BIOLOGICAL SAME-SEX CUSTODIAL RIGHTS BEFORE MARRIAGE

EQUALITY

Various schemes exist for granting non-biological third parties standing
for visitation or liability for support of children.7 When marriage and
second-party adoption were unavailable to same-sex couples, these rules
were frequently used to define the custodial standing of non-biological
same-sex parents. 8 While this article argues that applying these rules
generally to same-sex couples is problematic, some background on the
concepts and prior application to same-sex couples is instructive.
A parental presumption is sometimes provided to non-biological parents
under the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA). 9 The National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved the UPA 10 in 1973 to
"establish a set of rules for presumptions of parentage" and "shun the term
'illegitimate."" ' A version of the UPA has been adopted in at least
6. The background provided here is limited to the scope of this article's
argument. Significant thought has been devoted to the survey and definition of samesex parental rights. See Jeffrey A. Parness, ParentageLaw (R)evolution: The Key
Questions, 59 WAYNE L. REV. 743, 744-745 (2013).
7. See 24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation § 213 (2016).
8. See Courtney G. Joslin, Shannon P. Minter, & Catherine Sakimura, LESBIAN,
GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER FAMILY LAW §7:5 (2015).
9.

UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT

§4

(UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1973).

10.

UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1973).

11.

UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, Prefatory Note (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2002).
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nineteen states. 12 The UPA presumes parentage, in the absence of
biological verification, in certain cases. The UPA also provides that a man
is presumed to be the natural father of a child when the child is born during
marriage, when the man acknowledges his paternity in writing, or when "he
receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his
natural child."1 3 Later, the UPA provides that for determining maternal
paternity "[i]nsofar as practicable, the provisions of this Act applicable to
the father and child relationship apply., 14 In its comments, the UPA states
that:
[w]hile it is obvious that certain provisions in these Sections would not
apply in an action to establish the mother and child relationship, the
Committee decided not to burden these already complex provisions with
references to the ascertainment of maternity. In any given case, a judge
facing a claim for the determination of the mother and child relationship
should have little difficulty deciding which portions [of the UPA should
apply]. 5
In states where the UPA has been adopted, interpretation of these
provisions has been key to the custodial standing of non-biological samesex partners.' 6 California 7 and Kansas's have interpreted the UPA broadly
to provide standing to non-biological same-sex parents. Missouri has
interpreted the UPA as denying standing to a non-biological same-sex
parent.19
In an early and groundbreaking case, Elias B. v. Superior Court, the
California Supreme Court found that a woman who agreed to raise children
with her lesbian partner, supported her partner's artificial insemination, and
held the two children out as her own, was the children's parent under the
UPA and had the obligation to support them.20 Kansas has also read the
UPA to allow standing by non-biological same-sex parents. In Frazierv.
Goudschaal, a biological parent argued that there was no subject matter

12. Parentage Act (1973) - Enactments by State, THE NAT'L. CONFERENCE OF
COMM'RS
ON
UNIFORM
STATE
LAWS
(Mar.
3,
2016,
12:53PM),

http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Parentage%20Act%20%281973%29.
13.

UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4.

14. Id. § 21 cmt. (1973).
15. Id.

16. See Ann M. Haralambie, Handling Child Custody, Abuse and Adoption
Cases, §8:6 (2015); Karen Moulding and National Lawyers Guild, Lesbian, Gay,

Bisexual and Transgender Committee, Sexual Orientationand Law, §1: 15 (2016).
17. Elisa B. v. Super. Ct., 117 P.3d 660, 662 (Cal. 2005).
18. Frazier v. Goudschaal, 295 P.3d 542, 553 (Kan. 2013).
19.

White v. White, 293 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009).

20. See Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 662; see also MOULDING supra note 16.
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jurisdiction for a non-biological same-sex parent to decide the custody
issues involving her child because the parties were not married. 2' The
court avoided this issue by invoking its equitable jurisdiction to specifically
enforce the co-parenting agreement that had been entered into by the
parties. 22 The biological parent also suggested a reading of the Kansas
Parenting Act, modeled after the UPA, which acknowledged standing only
for one biological father and one biological mother.23 However, the court
read the statute permissively to allow for the possibility of more than one
mother to be an interested party under the act.24 Additionally, the
biological parent argued that her previous co-parenting agreement was
unenforceable as contrary to public policy.

25

While the biological parent

argued that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Troxel v.
Granville26 and Kansas' parental preference doctrine trumped the coparenting agreement, the court found that she actually exercised these
rights and asserted these preferences when she entered into the coparenting agreement.2 7 The court was unwilling to find the agreement void
"merely because the biological mother agreed to share the custody of her
children with another, so long as the intent, and effect, of the arrangement
was to promote the welfare and best interests of the children., 28 The
biological parent's reference to prior precedent preventing "grandparent
like" figures to limit standing was unpersuasive. 29 The court found the
standing of an unrelated third party distinguishable from "an agreement
between two adults to utilize artificial insemination to bring
children into
30
the world to be raised and nurtured by the both of them."
In contrast, Missouri denied a non-biological same-sex parent standing
by reading its version of the UPA to limit parentage to only one mother and
one father. In White v. White, a same-sex couple had two children. Each
partner gestated one of the children. Upon dissolution of the relationship,
one of the parties prevented visitation of the non-biological parent to that

21. Frazier,295 P.3d at 551-52.
22. Id. at 552.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 554.
25. Id.
26. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000).
27. Frazier,295 P.3d at 554.
28. Id. at 556.
29. Id. at 555-56.
30. The court also notes that it is not required to adopt the concept of a
psychological parent because the parties have already recognized the non-biological
parent's status here through the parenting agreement. Id. at 556.
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adult's own biological child. 3 The non-biological partner petitioned for
custody and the biological parent argued that the non-biological parent did
not have standing. 32 The court first rejected the non-biological parent's
contention that she can establish standing under Missouri law because the
statute is designed to allow parties to bring a claim when there is no
presumed biological father or mother, but that if a biological father or
mother is identified, the right to bring such standing does not exist.33 The
court found that standing under its adoption of the UPA "only allows
claims for declaration of a parent-child relationship based on a biological
tie or a presumption due to marriage or attempted marriage." 34 The nonbiological parent argued that she was the de facto or equitable parent, but
the court found no authority for the doctrine in Missouri case law and
declined to adopt the concept.35
The court also declined to provide standing to the non-biological parent
based on her acting in loco parentis, finding that to the extent Missouri had
adopted this doctrine statutorily, it only applied to a stepparent's obligation
to support a step child. The court determined that the doctrine shall not be
construed to grant a stepparent any right to the care and custody of a
stepchild, and care and custody terminates when the child is no longer
living in the same home. 36 Finding that there is no precedent for applying
the concept of equitable estoppel to paternal relationships, the court also
declined to find for the non-biological parent on this argument.37 In
Missouri, a natural parent has a superior right to custody of a child, but "the
parental presumption can be rebutted even though the parent or parents are
found to be fit and competent, upon a showing 'that the welfare of the
children, due to special or extraordinary circumstances, renders it in their
best interests that their custody be granted to a third person."' 38 The court
did not find any potential relationship on the part of the non-biological
same-sex parent to the child as such an exceptional circumstance.39

31.
32.

White v. White, 293 S.W.3d 1, 9 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009).
Id.

33.

Id.

34. Id. at 11.
35. Id. at 16.
36. Id. at 15-16.
37. Id. at 18.
38. Id.
39. "Accordingly, at least since 1973, Missouri courts have recognized that a third
party's foundational standing to litigate custody or visitation is dependent upon the
third party being a named party in an action brought by someone else (parent, Juvenile
Officer) or being permitted to intervene in a pending action (dissolution) or in cases
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Other jurisdictions have defined a non-biological same-sex partner's
standing under rules that would apply generally to adult third parties, such
4°
as grandparents, stepparents or others acting in loco parentis.
The standing of third parties to petition for custody or visitation is
limited by the Supreme Court's decision in Troxel v. Granville.4 1 At the
time, a Washington statute allowed any person to petition at any time for
visitation rights to a child and authorized a court to grant such right if it
was in the child's best interest. 42 The children's father in Troxel was
deceased and the paternal grandparents petitioned for greater visitation than
was being permitted by the children's mother.4 3 The Supreme Court found
that the Washington statute was unconstitutional because it did not presume
that a fit parent will act in the best interest of the child and failed to provide
any protection for the parent's constitutional right to make decisions
regarding her children.44 Importantly, the Court declined to address
"whether the Due Process Clause requires all non-parental visitation
statutes to include a showing of harm or potential harm to the child as a
condition precedent to granting visitation,, 45 whether parental unfitness
was a precondition to overriding a parent's determination of the children's
best interests, and "the precise scope of the parental due process right in the
visitation context. 'A6 The limits of the Troxel decision have formed the
boundaries of enforceability of third party standing rules going forward.47
In Egan v. Fridlund-Horne, the Arizona Court of Appeals denied
standing to a non-biological same-sex parent for visitation using the
limitations applicable to other third parties, such as grandparents,
stepparents, and others who acted in loco parentis.48 The court of appeals
found error in a lower court's grant of standing for visitation rights to a

where the third party already has something other than de facto custody (decretal
custody)." Id. at 21.
40. See Courtney G. Josling, Leaving No (Nonmarital)Child Behind, 48 Fam. L.Q.
495 (2014); Thomas A. Jacobs,

CHILDREN AND THE LAW: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS §

6:8 (2015).
41. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 59-60 (2000) (determining that the
Washington statute allowing any person to petition for third-party custody or visitation
violated the parents due process rights).
42. Id. at 58.
43. Id.at 69.
44. Id.at 63-64.
45. Id.at 66.
46.

Id.

47. See In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546, 552 (Colo. App. 2004), where Colorado
noted these limitations in allowing a same-sex parent standing to seek visitation.
48. Egan v. Fridlund-Home, 211 P.3d 1213, 1222 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009).
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non-biological same-sex parent because evidence was not introduced to
rebut the presumption that the biological parent was acting in the best
interest of the child.49 The non-biological same-sex parent argued that her
rights were distinguishable from those provided under the third-party
visitation statute50 but the court disagreed.51 Important to the court in this
case was the fact that the biological parent was not contesting visitation
generally, but rather only the amount of visitation awarded to the former
same-sex partner. 52 Arizona declined to recognize any common law de
facto parenting doctrine that would afford "a fundamental liberty interest in
the care, custody, and control of the child, to the same extent as the legal
parent., 53 Key to the court's decision was the distinction between the
fundamental rights of a biological parent as distinct to those of a nonparent.54
In contrast, Colorado determined that a non-biological same-sex parent
had standing to seek custody under its statutory framework for third
parties. 5' Non-biological third parties are permitted standing to seek
custody in Colorado as psychological parents. 56 In In re E.L.MC., the
adoptive parent of a child argued that her former same-sex partner was
barred from standing because she did not have a legal relationship to the
child, the petition for custody was not incidental to a marriage dissolution
proceeding, and that as the legal parent she had not relinquished custody of
the child. 57 The court rejected all of these arguments based on its

49. Id. at 1225.
50. "She argues that each of those cases involved grandparents who were third
parties to the basic family unit. She contends that she stands in a much different
position than a typical grandparent because: (1) Egan invited Hochmuth into a parentlike relationship with the child; (2) Egan had Hochmuth artificially inseminate her; (3)
Egan used Hochmuth's name for the child's middle name; (4) Egan allowed
Hochmuth's name to be on the child's birth certificate; and (5) Egan treated Hochmuth
as a co-parent for seven years. Thus, according to Hochmuth, Egan should be estopped
from denying substantial visitation rights based on Egan's invitation to join the family
unit and participate in all aspects of the child's life." Id.at 1220.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1220.
53. Id.at 1221 (contrasting In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 178 (Wash.
2005)).
54. This is illustrated by the court's extensive discussion of Troxel, determining
the rights of a biological parent as adverse to the rights of third parties, as a framework
for their decision. Id. at 1218-29.
55. In re E.L.M.C.,100 P.3d 546 (Colo. App. 2004).
56. Id. at 554.
57. Id.
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interpretation of the standing statute. 58 The court also found that the award
of custody was compelling even in light of the adoptive parent's
constitutional rights as the "sole, and fit, legal parent., 59 Taking note of
Troxel and its own state precedent, the court rejected a requirement that a
parent be unfit for interference with the parent's parenting plan. 60 The court
explicitly stated that for purposes of applying the psychological parent
doctrine, the fact that the adoptive mother and psychological parent are the
61
same sex is not relevant.
In Indiana, a non-biological same-sex partner was also found to have
standing to seek visitation under a third party standing doctrine. 62 in
Indiana, the rights of third parties for standing to seek visitation is governed
by case law.63 Acknowledging that the Indiana Supreme Court had vacated
a prior decision finding parentage in a non-biological same-sex parent, the
Indiana Court of Appeals still found that "a partner who did not give birth
to the child has standing to seek visitation with the child. This is not to say
that a former domestic partner is automatically entitled to visitation in these
circumstances-it
must still be established that visitation is in the child's
' 64
best interests.
III.

NON-BIOLOGICAL SAME-SEX CUSTODIAL STANDING AFTER
MARRIAGE EQUALITY

After marriage equality, Florida, Illinois, and New York have continued
to prohibit or greatly limit non-biological same-sex parent custodial
standing.
Oklahoma and Oregon, however, have created tests that
acknowledge the unique role of non-biological same-sex parents and have
granted them custodial standing.
Florida recently denied a non-biological same-sex parent standing using
its traditional third party parenting standing doctrine. Florida does not
recognize the concepts of a de facto or psychological parent and does not
grant rights to a non-biological, non-legal parent unless there is proof that
the biological parent has deserted or abandoned the child.65 In Russel v.
Pasik, a non-biological same-sex parent petitioned a court for timesharing
of two children that she jointly raised with the biological parent. The

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
Id. at 558.
Id.
Id. at 551.
A.C. v. N.J., 1 N.E.3d 685, 697 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).
Id. at 696-97.
Id. at 697.
Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106, 110 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
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children were born to the biological mother via artificial insemination when
she and the biological parent were in a relationship.66 After the relationship
ended, the non-biological parent was allowed visitation by the biological
parent, provided financial support to the children, and listed them as
dependents on her health insurance policy. 67 However, the biological
parent later refused the non-biological parent visitation. 6
The nonbiological parent then petitioned the district court for timesharing on the
basis that she was the de facto or psychological parent to the children.69
The biological parent brought a motion to dismiss the non-biological
parent's petition because the non-biological parent did not have standing.70
The trial court declined to dismiss the case, but the District Court of
Appeals reversed, finding that the motion to dismiss should have been
granted because the non-biological parent did not have standing under
Florida law. 7'

In considering the issue, the Florida Court of Appeals noted the
requirements in Florida for visitation and timesharing and the explicit
limitation to parents. 72
As the non-biological parent's petition
acknowledged that she was not the legal parent of the child but instead a de
facto or psychological parent, the court found that she did not have
standing for timesharing in Florida. 73 The non-biological parent argued
that the biological parent had waived any right to her privacy by inviting
the non-biological parent to jointly raise the children.74 The court stated
that this argument was improperly plead for appeal and warned that it
would unlikely be persuasive because of numerous cases in Florida where
the court found that the biological parent did not waive his or her due
process rights through involvement of a nonparent. 75 When the nonbiological parent brought up her own due process rights, the court stated
that the due process rights of a parent are only triggered by the "biological

66. Russell v. Pasik, 178 So. 3d 55, 57 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015). Interesting to
note, but not material to the court's analysis, the non-biological parent in the case
involving these children was the biological parent to two other children born during the
relationship via artificial insemination. Id.at 57.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13. (West 2014).
73. Russell, 178 So. 3d at 60.
74.

Id.

75. See id.
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connection between parent and child., 76 Among others, the court cited a
precedential case where a same-sex egg-donor partner was granted parental
rights to a child born by her same-sex partner to explain the biological
connection requirement.77 The court stated that it is sympathetic to the
non-biological parent's desire to visit with the children and the potential
importance to the children, but that the legislature would have to change
the standing rules.7 s The court declined to comment on whether awarding
visitation would have been appropriate had the parties been married when
the children were born but referenced a case regarding the right to
visitation by an opposite-sex stepparent. 79 The court also noted that the
non-biological parent could have adopted
the children, which would have
80
given her the rights that she sought.
Illinois also recently denied standing to a non-biological same-sex parent
using its third party custodial standing rule. Illinois has an equitable
adoption doctrine that provides inheritance rights to a person treated as an
adopted child.8 ' Illinois also grants standing to grandparents, great82
grandparents, siblings or stepparents of a minor child seeking visitation.
In this case, the biological parent and non-biological parent were in a
relationship for at least six years.8 3 During a six-month period when the
parties were separated, the biological parent became pregnant. 4 Afterward
the parties reconciled and the non-biological parent was present at the
child's birth.8 5 According to the non-biological parent, the parties publicly
represented themselves as a family.8 6 After the parties' romantic
relationship dissolved, the non-biological parent continued to visit the
child, spend a few hours with him daily, and spent every other weekend
with him. 7 The parties discussed adoption of the child by the non76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
Id. at 60-61.
id at 61.
Id. (citing O'Dell v. O'Dell, 629 So. 2d 891 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)).
Id. at 61.
See In re Parentage of Scarlett Z.-D, 28 N.E.3d 776, 790-91 (Ill. 2015).
82. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT 5/607, repealed by P.A. 99-90, § 5-20 (2016) (effective
Jan. 1, 2016). While the statute referenced in the case has been repealed, Illinois
continues to afford limited standing to third parties. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/602.9
(2016).
83. See In re Visitation of J.T.H., 2015 IL App (lst) 142384, 3, 42 N.E.3d 433,
435 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 4.
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biological parent, but agreed to wait until they secured sufficient funds.88
Later the biological parent informed the non-biological parent that she no
longer wanted the non-biological parent to have contact with the child. 89
The non-biological parent filed a petition for visitation, alleging that
based on her intent to adopt the child and her parent-child relationship with
him, she had standing to seek visitation with the child under the equitable
adoption doctrine. 90 The biological parent filed a motion to dismiss
arguing that the non-biological parent lacked standing for visitation
rights. 9 The circuit court dismissed the non-biological parent's petition for
lack of standing. 92 The court of appeals upheld the lower court's
determination because the doctrine of equitable adoption
in Illinois is
93
solely a probate matter and not a basis for seeking custody.
The non-biological parent also argued that the long-standing parenting
schedule that the parties maintained should be recognized and upheld by
the court. The court distinguished an Illinois case where the court had
enforced a prior
visitation agreement because it was part of a court's
94
consent decree.
In so holding, we are not unsympathetic to the position of the [nonbiological parent], or even that of [the child], having developed a loving
relationship with each other that was encouraged by [the biological
parent] during the first seven years of the child's life. However, we are
unable to conclude that [the non-biological parent] has standing to
petition for visitation under the Illinois laws as they95 currently exist; thus,
we are unable to grant her the relief that she seeks.
Further, New York recently denied standing for visitation to a non96
biological same-sex parent when a fit biological parent opposed it.
Equitable estoppel does not prevent the biological parent from such
opposition where the non-biological parent has enjoyed a close relationship
with the child and exercised some control over the child without the
parent's consent. 97

Without much discussion, the Appellate Division of

88. Id. at 6.
89. Id. at 7.
90. Id. at 8.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 9.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 24.

94. See id. at 25.
95. Id. at 28.
96. See Barone v. Chapman-Cleland, 10 N.Y.S.3d 380, 380 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015)
(citing Matter of Palmatier v. Dane, 97 A.D.3d 864, 865 (2012); Matter of White v.
Wilcox, 109 A.D.3d 1145, 1146 (2013)).
97. See id. at 380.
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New York's Supreme Court found that these limitations on standing also
applied to former same-sex partners. 98
While the issue has yet to be addressed in a published opinion by courts
in Michigan, parties have also used an equitable parenting rule to deny
standing to non-biological same-sex parents. In Michigan, a third party
only has standing to petition for custody or visitation under an equitable
parenting theory if the couple was in fact married. 99 Before marriage
equality, this explicit marriage requirement was used to bar non-biological
same-sex parents standing to obtain custody or visitation. After marriage
equality, the Michigan Supreme Court vacated a lower court's decision to
deny standing to a non-biological same-sex parent married in a foreign
jurisdiction at a time when same-sex marriage was illegal in Michigan. 00
The Michigan Supreme Court's direction to the lower court to reconsider
its decision in light of Obergefell appears to signal that Michigan courts
must recognize out-of-state marriages for purposes of Michigan's limited
standing requirements; however, it remains to be seen whether Michigan
will adjust its standing requirement to grant standing to those nonbiological same-sex parents who were unable to take advantage of the
opportunity to be married somewhere else.
While Florida, Illinois, and New York have continued to strictly limit
non-biological same-sex parent standing after marriage equality, Oregon
and Oklahoma have created tests to allow standing for non-biological
same-sex parents distinct from other adult third parties.
In re Madrone was decided in Oregon before Obergefell, but after
federal district courts had found same-sex marriage bans illegal in
Oregon. 10' Oregon has a presumption of parentage for a husband who is
married to a woman when the woman bears a child by artificial
10 2
insemination and the husband has consented to the insemination.
Previously, when same-sex couples were not permitted to marry in Oregon,
the court extended this presumption to a same-sex partner to prevent such a
privilege to opposite-sex couples from being a violation of the Oregon state
constitution. 0 3 As same-sex marriage was permitted at the time of In re
98. Id. Leave to appeal this case has been granted Court of Appeals of New York
(that state's highest court), but there has been no disposition of this appeal as of yet.
See Barone v. Chapman-Cleland, 38 N.E.3d 827, 827 (N.Y. 2015).
99. See Van v. Zahorik, 597 N.W.2d 15, 19 (Mich. 1999).
100. See Stankevich v. Milliron, 868 N.W.2d 907, 907 (Mich. 2015).
101. See Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 994 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1132-33 (D. Or. 2014); In re
Madrone, 350 P.3d 495 (Or. Ct. App. 2015).
102.

OR. REV. STAT. § 109.243 (2016).

103. Madrone, 350 P.3d at 496 (citingIn re Shineovich and Kemp, 214 P.3d 29
(Or. Ct. App. 2009)).
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Madrone, the court faced whether the same-sex parental presumption
should extend to only married couples.'04
The parties gave birth to a child by the biological parent.' 0 5 Afterward,
the state provided the parties the opportunity to register as domestic
partners and they did.' °6 The couple then dissolved their domestic
partnership. 0 7 The child's non-biological mother sought a declaration that
she was the child's legal parent because she was the same-sex partner of
the biological mother and consented to the insemination, which had
previously been outlined by Oregon as a requirement. 1°8 The trial court
granted summary judgment to the non-biological mother on the issue. The
Oregon Court of Appeals reversed, applying a parentage presumption to the
non-biological same-sex parent "if the partner of the biological parent
consented to the insemination and the couple
would have chosen to marry
9
had that choice been available to them."'0
The biological mother argued that the facts were distinguishable from
Oregon's prior extension of legal parentage to a non-biological same-sex
parent because she and her partner were not registered as domestic partners
at the time of the child's birth (but rather afterwards)." 0 The court
disagreed. "Given that same-sex couples were until recently prohibited
from choosing to be married, the test for whether a same-sex couple is
similarly situated to the married opposite-sex couple... cannot be whether
the same-sex couple chose to be married or not. Rather, the salient question
is whether the same-sex partners would have chosen to marry before the
child's birth had they been permitted to.""'
The court then stated that the determination of whether a couple would
have chosen to marry
is a question of fact, to be determined by considering
2
various factors. 1
A couple's decision to take advantage of other options giving legal
recognition to their relationship-such as entering into a registered
domestic partnership or marriage when those choices become
available-may be particularly significant. Other factors include whether
the parties held each other out as spouses; considered themselves to be
104.

Id.

105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See id. (citing In re Shineovich and Kemp, 214 P.3d 29 (Or. Ct. App. 2009));
see also Shineovich, 214 P.3d at 40.
109. Id.
110.

Id.at499.

111.

Id. at501.

112.

Id.
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spouses (legal purposes aside); had children during the relationship and
shared childrearing responsibilities; held a commitment ceremony or
otherwise exchanged vows of commitment; exchanged rings; shared a
last name; commingled their assets and finances; made significant
financial decisions together; sought to adopt any children either of them
may have had before the relationship began; or attempted unsuccessfully
to get married. We hasten to emphasize that the above list is not
exhaustive. Nor is any particular factor dispositive (aside from
unsuccessfully attempting to get married before same-sex marriages
were legally recognized in Oregon.. .),given that
13 couples who choose
not to marry still may do many of those things. 1
After articulating these factors, the court found that material issues of
fact remained, and denied the non-biological parent's motion for summary
judgment. 114
The biological parent also argued that the requirement of the biological
parent's consent under the Oregon law required that the biological parent
have explicitly sought the approval of the non-biological parent in order to
receive such consent, which in the eyes of the biological parent she did not
do.' 15 The court clarified that the statute simply requires the assent or
approval of the non-biological parent. 16
Oklahoma also created a standing rule for non-biological same-sex
couples, recognizing the unique circumstances existing before marriage
equality in Ramey v. Sutton. 1 7 The lower court in this case granted a
motion to dismiss on the basis that a non-biological parent did not have
standing for custody or visitation because the couple had not married and
did not have a parenting agreement.1 8 The Oklahoma Supreme Court
previously upheld the rights of a non-biological parent and partner in a civil
9
union to the biological mother under a written parenting agreement. 11
However, in this case the non-biological same-sex partner sought
standing even though the couple was not married and there was no
parenting agreement. 120 The court acknowledged the standing rights of a
non-biological parent who has acted in loco parentis when prior to the right
to marry being available in Oklahoma, the couple "(1) [was] unable to
marry legally; (2) engaged in intentional family planning to have a child

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 501-02.
Id. at 502.
See id.
Id.at503.
See Ramey v. Sutton, 362 P.3d 217, 219 (Okla. 2015).
Id.at 218.
See id. at 217; see also Eldredge v. Taylor, 339 P.3d 888, 891 (Okla. 2014).
Ramey, 362 P.3d at 217.
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and to co-parent; and (3) the biological parent acquiesced and encouraged
1 21
the same sex partner's parental role following the birth of the child."
Appreciating the precarious position of same-sex couples before marriage
equality, the court stated that "[t]he couple's failure to marry cannot now
be used as a means to further deprive the non-biological parent, who has
acted in loco parentis, of a best interests of the child hearing. 1 22 After
listing numerous facts about the non-biological and biological parents'
relationship to each other and the child,1 23 the court found that the nonbiological parent had "been intimately involved in the conception, birth and
parenting of their child, at the request and invitation" of the biological
parent.1 24 The uncertainty that the non-biological parent could have faced
in this case, in the view of the court, is the "exact peril identified in
Obergefell., 125 The court notes that the non-biological parent was not
attempting to obtain custody in substitution of the biological parent, but
was rather only looking to be recognized as a parent
and to have that
126
considered as it relates to the best interests of the child.
IV. THE NEED TO ACKNOWLEDGE NON-BIOLOGICAL SAME-SEX PARENT
CUSTODIAL STANDING

Non-biological same-sex parents who did not have the benefit of legal
marriage should not be denied standing to seek custody of the children born
during their relationships.
By discriminating based on biological
limitations, rules denying non-biological same-sex parents standing conflict
with Obergefell and fail to equally protect non-biological same-sex parents
and their children. The custodial standing of non-biological same-sex
parents is distinguishable from that of other third parties and may be
granted within current constitutional constraints without infringing on the
rights of a biological parent.
Denial of standing for non-biological same-sex parents is discrimination
based on a biological limitation beyond their control. Limitations on nonbiological parental standing were designed to protect the parental
prerogatives of a biological parent against third parties. This is a valid and
important consideration. However, denying a non-biological same-sex
parent standing for custody based solely on biology is troublesome. The
law has now recognized the constitutional validity of a same-sex marriage

121. Id. at 218.
122. Id. at 220-21.
123. See id. at219.
124. Id. at 221.
125.

Id.

126. Id.
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and we must also recognize that there will always be a non-biological
parent in same-sex parent families. This is simply a reality of same-sex
couples that does not exist for opposite-sex couples.
Failing to
acknowledge this difference in the rules of standing outside of marriage
perpetuates discriminates against same-sex couples.
Providing non-biological same-sex parents custodial standing will not
"open the floodgates" to challenges to the biological parent's parental
prerogatives, and continuing to rely on this rationale places the biological
parent's prerogative over the child's best interest. Limitations on third
party standing are sometimes criticized as putting misplaced weight on
formulaic rules over the best interest of a child without considering the best
interest of the child in each particular case. Advocates for such strict rules
argue that they serve as a protection to parents from the risk of unlimited
attack to their fundamental right to make choices in the best interest of their
child. This protection is important, but its significance fades in the context
of a same-sex parent family. States must instead design rules that
accommodate the unique position of the children in these families. It
would be more appropriate to first acknowledge the non-biological samesex parent's standing to custody and then make a determination on the
merits as to what would be in the best interest of the child, as would be
done between two biological parents.
Denying standing to non-biological same-sex parents also ignores the
equal protection rights of the child at issue. Failing to acknowledge
parentage by the non-biological same-sex parent denies the benefits of
inheritance, access to employee health insurance benefits, right to be in the
custody of the non-biological parent if the biological parent dies, ability to
maintain a relationship with both parents, and ability to receive child
support if the parents separate. The denial of standing may also influence
probate outcomes, further denying benefits to the children of these couples.
Denial of standing to non-biological same-sex parents places an unfair
expectation that the non-biological parent would have pursued legal
remedies that were uncertain at the time. Non-biological same-sex parents
and their children should not be judged for the failure to obtain custodial
rights through alternative legal methods. 127 Some may argue that the
standing of non-biological same-sex partners should be denied when there
was a failure to obtain available alternative legal rights to custody, such as
marriage, domestic partnership, a co-parenting agreement, or second-parent
adoption.
This argument fails to appreciate the tremendous legal
uncertainty that faced these same-sex couples in pursuing these options at
127. See id. at 220-21 (acknowledging the precarious position of same sex couples
before marriage equality and the unfairness of using their failure to take action as a bar
to non-biological parental custody).
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the time. Great emotional and financial trouble would have been required
to undertake these solutions in the limited circumstances when they were
available with the ultimate legal validity still in question. The Supreme
Court acknowledged that same-sex couples were "consigned to an
instability many opposite-sex couples would deem intolerable in their own
lives" 128 and "[tjhe marriage laws at issue thus harm and humiliate the
children of same-sex couples.' 129 Even if a court is unsympathetic to such
a quandary on the part of a same-sex couple, a child should not be
prejudiced by the failure of their same-sex parents to take such steps.
Denying standing to non-biological same-sex parents is contrary to the
30
call from Obergefell to avoid humiliation of same-sex parent families.
The Supreme Court has clearly found value in families created by same-sex
couples. The Court noted when granting a fundamental right to same-sex
marriage, that
it safeguards children and families and thus draws meaning from the
related rights of child-rearing, procreation, and education ... Marriage

also affords the permanency and stability important to children's best
interests ... Without recognition, stability

and predictability that

marriage offers, their children suffer the stigma of knowing that their
families are somehow lesser. They also suffer significant material costs
of being raised by unmarried parents, relegated through no of fault of
their own to a more difficult and uncertain family life.
To deny standing to a non-biological same-sex parent, when the
predicted legitimacy or option to marry was unavailable,
is to deny the
32
sanctity of the families the Supreme Court legitimized.1
Liberalization of standing in favor of non-biological same-sex parents is
consistent with the societal truth that fewer families are embracing the
institution of marriage.' 33 Many modem families, without regard to samesex relationships, do not fit the traditional framework of marriage. 134 To
128. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015).
129. Id. at 2600-61 (quoting United States v.Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 2694-95
(2013)).
130. See Ramey, 362 P.3d at 221 (stating that the uncertainty of a non-biological
parent's standing is the "exact peril identified in Obergefell").
131. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at2600.
132. Indeed, one may argue that failure to provide custodial rights to a same-sex
spouse exactly equal to that of a biological parent may also be unconstitutional. But
that is an argument for another time.
133. See Cynthia Grant Bowman, The Legal Relationship Between Cohabitantsand
their Partners'Children, 13 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 127, 129-30 (2012).
134. See Pamela Laufer-Ukeles & Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, Between Function and
Form: Towards a DifferentiatedModel of FunctionalParenthood,20 GEO. MASON L.
REV 419, 428 (2013).
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the extent that the limits on third party custodial standing are designed to
further the public policy of encouraging marriage, 135 it must be
acknowledged that the institution of marriage is on uneven footing amongst
opposite and same-sex couples alike. Any rule that discriminates against
same-sex non-biological parents at a time when they were unable to marry,
but provides custodial rights to unmarried opposite-sex parents, is
inherently unequal.
Non-biological same-sex custodial standing is highly distinguishable
from other third parties, and the same rules should not apply. In many
states, standing is strictly limited for non-biological, non-adoptive third
parties. Standing may be limited to grandparents, other blood relatives, or
stepparents, but usually only when the biological parent is determined
unfit. Non-biological same-sex parents are distinguishable from this group
and must not be subject to the same rules. A non-biological same-sex
parent may have had the strong desire at the time of the child's birth to be
the legal spouse of the biological parent, but was denied the right to do so;
the same-sex partner may have similarly been denied the opportunity to
legally adopt the child. These limitations on the ability to marry or jointly
adopt a child have now been found unconstitutional and the Supreme
Court's decision was grounded on the idea that non-biological same-sex
parents play a unique role compared to other adult third parties. Failure to
recognize the existence of these obstacles, now understood to be
unconstitutional, is an extension of the discrimination decried under
Obergefell. At the very least, these jurisdictions must provide a test, similar
to those in Oklahoma and Oregon, to determine whether these couples
36
would have married had the opportunity been available to them.'
Any reliance on Troxel in determining the rights of non-biological
unmarried same-sex partners is misplaced, as Troxel proceeded on an
assumption that those seeking custody are nonparents.137 Since Troxel, the
Supreme Court has explicitly stated that same-sex couples have a right to
marry and have families.1 38 When a non-biological same-sex parent was
135. See Van v. Zahorik, 597 N.W.2d 15, 21 (Mich. 1999).
136. See Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 994 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (D. Or. 2014); Ramey v.
Sutton, 362 P.3d 217, 221 (Okla. 2015). There is an argument that cases involving
grandparents who are third parties to the basic family unit should be treated differently
than domestic partners for a number of reasons: the birth mother invites the domestic
partner into a parent-like relationship with the child; in some cases, the partner may
help with the artificial insemination; the child may share both the birth mother and the
partner's name; the partner's name may be on the child's birth certificate; most
importantly, the partner may have been treated as a co-parent for a number of years.
Child Custody Prac. & Proc. § 7:15.
137. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 64 (2000).
138. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015).
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caught in the gap before marriage equality, any standing rule must

acknowledge this unique position and afford greater rights than those of
other third parties. The dichotomy of parent versus nonparent is misplaced
here. Even in the context of traditional third party standing, the Court in
Troxel did not define the biological parent's rights as absolute; it only
required a court to presume that a fit parent is acting in the best interest of a
child in the absence of factors showing otherwise.' 39 Certainly, the nonbiological same-sex parent's bond with the child is one such exceptional
factor.
Denial of non-biological same-sex custodial rights is also inconsistent
with the intent of the UPA to create a presumption of parentage for nonbiological parents outside of marriage. Under the most recent revision of
the UPA, "even if unmarried, "[a] man is presumed to be the father of a
child if... for the first two years of the child's life, he resided in the same
140
household with the child and openly held out the child as his own.'
While this 2002 revision does not specifically address the rights of a nonbiological same-sex parent, it does support the presumption of parentage
when an adult has accepted and represented a child as their own. There is
no reason that a non-biological same-sex parent under the UPA should be
treated differently. In a world where we acknowledge the fundamental
right to same-sex marriage, we must also acknowledge the inherent
limitation that one of these individuals was unable to biologically parent
the child. Given this limitation, allowing non-biological same-sex parents
this presumption affords these individuals with an important right
recognized by the drafters of the UPA.
V. APPROPRIATE FACTORS FOR DETERMINING NON-BIOLOGICAL SAMESEX PARENT STANDING

States that have denied non-biological same-sex parents standing for
custodial rights require reform, and other states should take swift legislative
action to solidify the custodial standing of these individuals. '41 In the states
that have adopted a version of the UPA or something similar, legislative
action or court interpretation should grant non-biological same-sex parents
a presumption of parenthood.
The UPA creates a presumption of
139.

See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 64; see also In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546, 558 (Colo.

App. 2004).
140.

UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(5) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2002).

141. See Russell v. Pasik, 178 So. 3d 55, 61 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (stating that
the court was not unsympathetic to a non-biological parent's position, but needed
direction from the legislature); see also In re Visitation of J.T.H., 42 N.E.3d 433, 440
(Ill. App. Ct. 2015) (stating that the court is not "unsympathetic" to the non-biological
parent, but cannot grant standing under current state law).
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parenthood when a father receives a child into their home and openly holds
them out as his child. 42 Courts should reject a binary reading of this
provision that allows a child to only have one father and one mother, as
was done in Missouri.143 Instead, states should embrace the spirit of the
UPA, including recent revisions,' 44 acknowledging that parental
relationships can arise without regard to biology and grant standing under
this provision to non-biological same-sex parents, as has been done in
45
California and Kansas. 146
In states that choose not to create a parental presumption for nonbiological same-sex parents under a version of the UPA or similar statute, a
unique test must be adopted to define the standing of these individuals
distinct from traditional third party custodial standing rules. A nonbiological same-sex parent should have standing when (i) the nonbiological parent and biological parent engaged in intentional family
planning to have a child and to co-parent and (ii) the biological parent
acquiesced and encouraged the non-biological parent's role following the
birth of the child. As discussed above, only one party in a same-sex couple
is able to act as biological parent to a child. The parties' joint intent and
the biological parent's acquiescence are appropriate substitutes to establish
the joint custodial standing of the non-biological parent when participating
in conception was impossible.
A court could consider other factors in determining a non-biological
same-sex parent's custodial standing, but these factors should be given less
weight. Considerations could include whether the parties: (i) attempted to
get married or enter into a domestic partnership and whether the nonbiological non-legal parent attempted to adopt the child; (ii) held
themselves out as a domestic unit; (iii) considered themselves as a domestic
unit; (iv) shared childrearing responsibilities; or (v) comingled their assets
or made significant financial decisions together. While these objective
indicators may be instructive of the parties' intent, it is important that these
factors not be determinative. At the time of these families' formations, the
legal uncertainty and challenge of societal acceptance of their domestic unit
cannot be over-emphasized. The parents' outward and objectively viewed
representation may not have been indicative of their subjective intent to
create a family.

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(5).
See White v. White, 293 S.W.3d 1, 9-11 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009).
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT

§ 204.

Elisa B. v. Super. Ct., 117 P.3d 660, 662 (Cal. 2005).
Frazier v. Goudschaal, 295 P. 3d 542, 545-46 (Kan. 2013).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2016

21

American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 24, Iss. 4 [2016], Art. 3

490

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 24:4

VI. CONCLUSION

Marriage equality has likely provided a clear path for same-sex couples
to establish joint custodial rights to children if their relationships dissolve.
Non-biological same-sex parents and the children born to them before
marriage equality are at risk in the wake of this sweeping change. Failing
to understand the unique position of these individuals through application
of traditional third party custody rules will result in tragic results; a nonbiological same-sex parent will be unable to get past the courtroom door in
making their case for custodial rights and the child could be separated from
someone that he or she had always perceived as a parent. Courts and
legislatures have the opportunity to prevent this injustice through the
design of standing thresholds that acknowledge the unique role of the nonbiological same-sex parent.

https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol24/iss4/3

22

